Penn State International Law Review
Volume 23
Number 2 Penn State International Law Review

Article 7

10-1-2004

Survey of the Domestic Approaches to Antitrust
Taken by the OPEC Member Nations: Do They
Practice What They Preach, A
Kieran A. Lasater

Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Recommended Citation
Lasater, Kieran A. (2004) "Survey of the Domestic Approaches to Antitrust Taken by the OPEC Member Nations: Do They Practice
What They Preach, A," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 23: No. 2, Article 7.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol23/iss2/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.

Comments

A Survey of the Domestic Approaches to
Antitrust Taken by the OPEC Member
Nations: Do They Practice What They
Preach?
Kieran A. Lasater*
I.

Introduction

The prices of petroleum products, especially sweet crude oil and
gasoline, are at rates that were unimaginable even ten years ago.' The
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, The Dickinson School of Law,
2005; B.S., The Pennsylvania State University, 1999. The author wishes to thank his
parents for their unending support and encouragement; his wife, Patricia Ann, for her
steadfast love; and his siblings, Zara, Keyne, Chryseis, Kendrik and Kalon, whose
friendship is without equal. The author also wishes to recognize the substantial
contributions made by Professor Perrie H. Naides and The Honorable J. Wesley Oler, Jr.,
whose patient tutelage made this comment possible.
Additionally, the author wishes to express his thanks to the Library of Congress'
Middle East and South American Legal Specialists, who provided access to key source
material. Lastly, the author wishes to recognize and thank the former, current and future
membership of this publication, for their important service and commitment to excellence
in the field of international legal scholarship.
1. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, gasoline prices on October 18,
2004, were 92 cents higher for a gallon of regular grade than they were on November 28,
1994. This represents an increase of approximately 71 percent. See U.S. Department of
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United States consumes more oil today than ever before 2 and its domestic
production covers only a fraction of its usage.3 In response to this
consumption/production deficit, the U.S. imports oil from various
nations,4 including member nations of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC).5
In an attempt to maximize their profits from oil, OPEC member
nations agree to limit or expand production of oil to create and maintain
artificially inflated oil prices.6 These collusive activities of OPEC, if
done by corporations or individuals, would clearly violate U.S. antitrust
7
law.
Energy, Retail Gasoline Historical Prices at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/
petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/mogas history.html (last visited October 19, 2004).
Retail gasoline prices hit record highs this spring, when, on May 24, 2004, a gallon of
regular gasoline averaged $2.06, and a gallon of premium grade averaged $2.24. Id. On
October 22, 2004, the price of crude oil reached a 21-year high of $55.17 per barrel. See
E.S. Browning, Dow Industrials Rally 138 Points as Insurers Rise, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Oct. 27, 2004, at C1.
2. In 2000, the U.S. consumed approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day
between transportation, industrial use, electrical production, residential and commercial
use. U.S. Department of Energy, Figure 14 Petroleum Consumption by Sector, available
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/eh/frame.html (last visited September 6, 2004).
3. In 2000, the U.S. produced roughly 8 million barrels of oil each day, and
imported roughly 12 million barrels of oil each day. U.S. Department of Energy, Figure
11 Petroleum Overview at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/eh/frame.html (last visited
September 6, 2004).
4. In 2003, the U.S. imported approximately 43 percent of its imported oil from
OPEC countries. See U.S. Department of Energy, Overview of U.S. Petroleum Trade:
available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/
Review,
Monthly
Energy
August
merquery/merdata.asp?table=TO1.07 (last visited September 6, 2004).
5. In 2003, the U.S. imported approximately 4.4 billion barrels of oil. See U.S.
Department of Energy, Overview of U.S. Petroleum Trade: August Monthly Energy
Review, available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/merquery/mer data.asptable=T01.07 (last
visited September 6, 2004). In contrast, the U.S. exported 361 million barrels of oil in
2003. See id.
OPEC's current membership is comprised of eleven countries. They include:
Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates and Venezuela. See Member Countries available at http://www.opec.org (last
visited Sept. 27, 2004).
6. General Information Booklet 10-11 at http://www.opec.org (last modified 2002)
[hereinafter OPEC Booklet].
7. See, e.g., Prewitt Enters., Inc., v. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting Countries,
2001 WL 624789, 9 (N.D. Ala. 2001) [hereinafter Prewitt], vacated and reheard by
Prewitt Enters., Inc., v. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 2004 WL 2039664
(N.D. Ala. 2004) (finding OPEC, who did not appear, is a per se violation of U.S.
antitrust law and imposed default judgment, as well as injunctive relief).
Pursuant to a motion by OPEC, who made a special appearance after initially failing
to respond, the default judgment and injunctive relief were subsequently vacated. OPEC
also made a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process, which was granted.
Prewitt appealed and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Prewitt Enters.,
Inc. v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 353 F.3d 916 (11 th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
Prewitt 2], rehearing en banc denied by Prewitt Enters. v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting
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Not all countries, however, share the same attitudes about free
competition in the marketplace. This is especially true of those few
remaining countries that embrace communist 8 and socialist 9 ideologies.
To date, there has been no single investigation of the domestic
attitudes of the OPEC member nations towards antitrust, as reflected in
their respective codifications. This comment attempts to do that.
Part II of this comment will briefly introduce the background of
OPEC, including its formation, membership, internal composition,
operation and goals. Part III will then provide a brief overview of the
various U.S. antitrust statutes, as well as their historical inapplicability to
OPEC.
Part IV will report on the domestic antitrust laws of each of OPEC's
member nations, seeking to determine if the OPEC nations practice what
they preach, or, whether they act in a contradictory manner with respect
to their domestic codifications. Part V will summarize and discuss the
implications of the survey's results, as well as highlight recent
developments, including the Iraq question. Part V will conclude with
suggestions on how the U.S. can minimize OPEC's negative effects.
II.
A.

OPEC
Formation

OPEC was created through various resolutions adopted at the
Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, held in Baghdad, Iraq, in
September of 1960.10 However, its formative origin is found in 1949,
when Venezuela, which sought to develop closer and more regular
communications regarding the price of oil, initiated discussions with
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.11
Further discussions were held a decade later, in 1959, at the First
Arab Petroleum Congress, at which time the attending nations agreed to
consult with one another before taking unilateral action with regard to oil

Countries, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 12376 (11 th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed,
U.S.L.W. (U.S. May 25, 2004) (NO. 03-1592).
8. China, Laos, Vietnam and Cuba are the only remaining communist countries.
See Communist Countries at http://www.aneki.com/communist.htmI (last visited Jan. 17,
2004).
9. North Korea is currently the only socialist country. See Socialist Countries
available at http://www.aneki.com/socialist.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
10. OPEC Statute, approved Jan. 1961, Chapter 1, art. 1 available at
http://www.opec.org/Publications/OS/OS.pdf (last modified 2000) [hereinafter OPEC

Statute].
11. OPEC Booklet, supra note 6, at 5.
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prices. 12 Additionally, the countries formed an Oil Consultation
Commission. 13 One year later, in response to its disapproval of then
existing oil prices, Iraq invited representatives from Iran, Kuwait, Saudi
for further discussions. 14 The product
Arabia and Venezuela, to Baghdad
15
of that conference was OPEC.
B. Membership
Headquartered in Vienna, Austria, 16 OPEC's current membership
includes: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. 17 Former members included Ecuador 8 and
Gabon, 19 who suspended and terminated their memberships, respectively,
in 1992 and 1995.20

Member countries can be either full members or associate
members. 21 Full members are the original founding members, as well as
interested countries with a substantial net export of crude oil, who also
22
share fundamentally similar interests with the member nations.
Prospective full members can be admitted to the organization by a threefourths majority vote of the full members, as well as a unanimous vote
by the founding members.23 Associate members are those members who
do not qualify as full members, but who are admitted by a three-fourths
majority vote of members, including a unanimous vote by the founding
members.24
C. Internal Composition and Operation
OPEC consists of three major subdivisions: (1) the Conference,
(2) the Board of Governors and (3) the Secretariat. 25 The Conference is
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id; OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 1, art. 1.
15. OPEC Booklet, supra note 6, at 5.
16. About OPEC-History, available at http://www.opec.org (last visited Sept. 6,
2004).
17. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
18. Ecuador suspended its membership in OPEC on November 27th, 1992, citing its
inability to meet its membership dues. See Ecuador Set to Leave OPEC, NEW YORK
TIMES, Sept. 18, 1992, at D 16.
19. Citing excessive membership fees, Gabon withdrew from OPEC at the end of
1995. See Gabon To Withdraw From OPEC Over Heavy Membership Dues, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Jan. 16, 1995, at Business 2.
20. OPEC Booklet, supra note 6, at 13.
21. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 2, art. 7(A-D).
22. Id. at Chapter 2, art. 7(B-C).
23. Id.; OPEC Booklet, supra note 6, at 12.
24. Id. at Chapter 2, art. 7(D); OPEC Booklet, supra note 6, at 12.
25. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, art. 9.
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the main power base of the organization, 26 meets at least twice per year,27
and consists of a delegation from each of the member nations.28 Each
delegation is allowed one vote.29 The Conference is responsible for the
generation of the organization's
policy goals, as well as the means
30
through which to achieve them.
The Board of Governors, which also meets twice per year,31 consists
of one governor for each member nation, 32 nominated by each member
nation,33 and who is confirmed by the Conference.34 As with the
Conference, the governor from each member nation is allowed one
vote.35
The Board is charged with managing the organization,3 6
implementing decisions of the Conference,37 preparing an annual
39
budget, 38 and various other managerial functions.
The Secretariat acts as the executive of the organization and is
under the direction of the Board of Governors. 40 The Secretariat consists
of a Secretary General and his or her staff,4' whose function is to act as
the representative of the organization, directing its affairs.42
D.

Goals
OPEC's primary goal is simple: to create a global oil market that

26. Id. at Chapter 3, art. 10; see also OPEC Booklet, supra note 6, at 6.
27. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, art. 12; OPEC Booklet, supra note 6,
at 6.
28. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, art. 11(A).
29. Id. at Chapter 3, art. 11 (C).
30. Id. at Chapter 3, art. 15; OPEC Booklet, supra note 6, at 6.
31. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, art. 18(A).
32. OPEC Booklet, supra note 6, at 7.
33. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, art. 17(A); OPEC Booklet, supra
note 6, at 7.
34. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, art. 17(A); OPEC Booklet, supra
note 6, at 7.
35. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, art. 17(D).
36. Id. at Chapter 3, art. 20(1); OPEC Booklet, supra note 6, at 7.
37. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, art. 20(1); OPEC Booklet, supra note
6, at 7.
38. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, art. 20(4); OPEC Booklet, supra note
6, at 7. OPEC is funded by its member nations. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter
5, art. 37-38.
39. See OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, arts. 20-24; see OPEC Booklet,
supra note 6, at 7.
40. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, art. 25; OPEC Booklet, supra note 6,
at 7.
41. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, art. 26; OPEC Booklet, supra note 6,
at 7.
42. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 3, art. 27(A-B); OPEC Booklet, supra
note 6, at 7.
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fosters consistent profits for member nations.43 The organization has
in its Statute, 44 sundry
been quite forthright in its goals, declaring them
45 and various OPEC publications. 46
news releases
The pursuit of profits is innocuous in itself, as it is the essence of
capitalism.4 7 However, the means by which the organization seeks to
achieve that goal have garnered OPEC perpetual disdain within the
United States.48
III.

U.S. Antitrust Law

Through the juxtaposition of the domestic antitrust laws of the
OPEC member nations, with those of the U.S., it is possible to better
understand the disparities revealed by this survey, detailed infra. In the
broadest terms, "antitrust" refers to various proscribed actions taken by
market participants, which include: developing monopolies, price
discrimination, price-fixing and unlawful restraint of trade.49
Congress, in response to the deleterious effects of these proscribed
activities, has enacted three major Acts designed to protect consumers
and businesses, as well as the American economy as a whole. The three
acts are the Sherman,5 ° the Clayton,"' and the Robinson-Patman5 2 Acts.
The Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts were the product of Congress'

43. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 1, art. 2(A-B); OPEC Booklet, supra
note 6, at 10-11.
44. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 1, art. 2.
45. See, e.g., Prewitt, supra note 7, at 3 (wherein court cites "107 th Meeting of the
OPEC Conference," OPEC Press Release No. 2/1999 (March 23, 1999), in which OPEC
announced its decision to reduce and limit oil production to try and increase oil prices,
and "Report of the 26"h Meeting of the [OPEC] Ministerial Monitoring Sub-Committee,"
OPEC Press Release No. 4/1999 (July 30, 1999), wherein OPEC reports on the effects of
the aforementioned reduction in production).
46. See generally OPEC Booklet, supra note 6.
47. See Joel F. Herold, Wages, Workers, and Potential Windfalls: Rethinking Section
8(A)(3) Labor Disputes In a Capitalist Economy, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 657 n.170
(1998) (citing ANDREW ZIMBALIST ET AL., COMPARING ECONOMIc SYSTEMS: A
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC APPROACH 5 (2d ed. 1989)).
48. Andrew C. Udin, Comment, Slaying Goliath: The ExtraterritorialApplication of
U.S. Antitrust Law to OPEC, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1321, 1324 (2001) (citing 146 Cong.
Rec. S1942, wherein OPEC's price-fixing practices are deemed "reprehensible")
[hereinafter Udin].
Recently released 30 year-old British intelligence documents reveal that during the
height of the OPEC oil embargo of 1973-74, the U.S. seriously considered seizing several
key oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi. Glenn Frankel, U.S. Mulled
Seizing Oil Fields In '73; British Memo Cites Notion of Sending Airborne to Mideast,
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 1, 2004, at AO1.

49.
50.
51.
52.

See Udin, supra note 48, at 1331-32 nn.66-69.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
15 U.S.C. § 12 (1997).
15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-b, 21a (2003).
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Act,5 3
attempt to more fully effectuate the purposes of the Sherman
54
which represents the bedrock foundation of U.S. Antitrust law.
The Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted to protect consumers from
the evils of a market without the benefits of natural competition, as well
as to facilitate economic efficiency.55 The theoretical underpinning of
the Act is the belief that, through the rigors of fair competition between
market participants, the best products at the lowest prices will emerge,
and an environment will be created simultaneously which is conducive to
56
the fostering of democratic political and social institutions.
The Act provides, in relevant part, "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal. 5 7 Read literally, the language of the statute makes
all contracts illegal because every contract works, in some way, as a
restraint of trade.5 8 Therefore, American courts have interpreted the
statute so as to proscribe contracts that "unreasonably" restrain
competition. 9
Price-fixing is a prime example of the type of conduct proscribed by
the Act, and has been defined as: groups or associations "formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing.., or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in... commerce. '60 A comparison
of the OPEC Statute's objective, noted infra, found in Chapter 1, Article
2 (B-C), is chilling in its similarity to the proscribed conduct in the
aforementioned definition of price-fixing.
Section B of Article 2 provides, in relevant part: "the Organization
shall devise ways and means of ensuring the stabilization of prices...

53. Udin, supra note 48, at 1332 n.72 (citing Richard A. Posner, The RobinsonPatman Act: Federal Regulation of Price Differences 1 (1976)).
54. The Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts are more specific in nature, and,
therefore, are beyond the scope of this comment. As such, they will not be discussed
further.
55. Jarod Spencer Gonzalez, Antitrust Law: A long Time Coming-United States
Supreme Court Adopts The "Rule of Reason" Test for Vertical Maximum Price Fixing
Cases in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 645 n.5 (1999).
56. Udin, supra note 48, at 1333 (citing N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4

(1958)).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
58. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof 1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 (1978)
(stating that if the provision was read literally, the Act would outlaw the entire body of
contract law because all contracts restrain trade).
59. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911);
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 241 (1918).
60. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); see Udin,
supra note 48, at 1333-34 (citing Douglas R. Richmond, Private Colleges and Tuition
Price-Fixing:An Antitrust Primer, 17 J.C. & U.L. 271, 275 (1991)).
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with a view to eliminating... fluctuations.' ' Additionally, Section C of
Article 2 provides that "due regard shall be given at all times to the
interests of... securing a steady income to the producing
Through the comparison of OPEC's express objective,
countries....
definition of price-fixing, it becomes clear OPEC's
foregoing
the
with
objective is quite nearly a verbatim reiteration of the definition of pricefixing.
A.

HistoricalApplication of U.S. Antitrust Law to OPEC

Since its inception in 1960, the collusive actions of OPEC have
spoken much louder than the words of its objective, supra, unabashedly
declaring OPEC's aim. Indeed, OPEC has been the defendant in two
major antitrust cases. The first such case was InternationalAss'n of
Machinists v. OPEC.
1.

International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC

The American public's attitude about OPEC has never been more
virulent than it was during the height of the oil crises of the 1970's.63 At
that time, the U.S.'s oil supplies were at such low levels, Americans were
only able to fill their vehicles with gasoline on certain days-depending
on their license plate numbers--and long lines of frustrated motorists
wrapped around U.S. city blocks. 64 In an attempt to stave the demand for
gasoline, the speed limit on roadways was reduced to fifty-five miles per
hour. 65 Additionally, as a means of increasing domestic production of
oil, and, thereby, reducing the nation's dependence on OPEC oil, the
U.S. constructed the trans-Alaskan oil pipeline, which went on-line in
1977.66

61. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 1, art. 2(B) (emphasis provided); OPEC
Booklet, supra note 6, at 10-11.
62. OPEC Statute, supra note 10, at Chapter 1, art. 2(C) (emphasis provided); OPEC
Booklet, supra note 6,at 10-11 (emphasis provided).
63. Udin, supra note 48, at 1322 (citing Barbara Rudolph, Enjoy Now, Pay Later; As
Oil Imports Raise and Output Falls, the US. May Face a Future Shock, 129 TIME
MAGAZINE, Mar. 16, 1987, at 54, available at 1987 WL 2364550 (detailing the oil crisis
of the 1970's)).
64. Udin, supra note 48, at 1322 (citing DANIEL YERGIN, TuE PRIZE, 616 (1991)
(discussing the various vexing aspects of the oil crisis, including the drastic raise in
prices, the long lines, and the limited supply of gasoline, leading to some outages).
65. Report to Congress, The Effect of Increased Speed Limits in the Post-NMSL
Era, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 1 (Feb. 1998) available at
(last visited
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/Rpts/1998/Speedlim.pdf
Sept. 6, 2004).
66. See Alyeska Pipeline, available at http://www.alyeska-pipe.com (last visited
Sept. 6, 2004).
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As far as the general population was concerned, OPEC was
culprit of the shortages and its member states bore the brunt of
nation's collective enmity. From that acrimonious atmosphere came
first antitrust suit 67against OPEC, that of International Ass'n

421
the
the
the
of

Machinists v. OPEC.

a.

District court

In 1978, a labor union filed an action which sought monetary
damages from, and injunctive relief against, OPEC and its member
nations, 68 alleging price-fixing of oil by OPEC and its member nations in
violation of the Sherman Act. 69 Neither OPEC, nor any of its various
member nations, made an appearance. 70 At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court granted judgment for the defendants, and in7 1 its
opinion, insulated OPEC with a bulwark of defenses against liability.
The court provided the following as a bar to liability: 1) OPEC
72
could not be and was not legally served under the Foreign Sovereign
73
Immunities Act; 2) The claims for damages failed because of the direct

purchaser doctrine, which requires a putative plaintiff to have dealt
directly with the defendant(s); 74 3) Foreign nations were not "persons"
for purposes of the Sherman Act, and, therefore, were exempt; 75 and
4) The plaintiff had failed to prove proximate causation by OPEC of the
actual cost of gasoline at a domestic service station.76
67. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 477
F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
68. At the time of the suit, OPEC consisted of 13 member nations: Algeria, Ecuador,
Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates, and Venezuela. Ecuador and Gabon are no longer members. See OPEC
Booklet, supra note 6, at 12-13; see also supra notes 18-19.
69. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 67, at 558.
70. Id. at 559-60.
71. See generally Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 67.
72. Id. at 560.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1602. The court also stated that OPEC could not be served under
the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. § 288), because the United
States does not participate in OPEC, as is required under the act. Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists, supra note 67, at 560.
74. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 67, at 560-61 (citing Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 432 U.S. 720 (1977) (where Court held that a plaintiff in a price-fixing case must
have purchased directly from the alleged price-fixer in order to recover).
75. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 67, at 570-72.
76. Id. at 573 (finding there were dramatic increases in the price of crude oil
between 1973-1974 and 1978-1979, but that the plaintiffs failed to show OPEC's actions
were a substantial factor therein).
In the conclusion of the opinion, the court eloquently praised the plaintiff for
bringing the suit, thereby raising the public's awareness of the issue of domestic energy
policy. The court scolded the executive branch for failing to remedy the situation and
called upon them to take action. The court also praised certain counsel who submitted
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On appeal

The case was subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the district court's judgment in 1981; however,
the court relied on different reasoning.7 7 Despite the plethora of possible
bars to liability, as cited and relied upon by the district court, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals limited their focus to the interrelated issues of
sovereign immunity and the acts of state doctrine.78
In discussing the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the court noted its
ideological roots in the long-held belief that each sovereign state is equal
to all others, and, therefore, should not be subject to the jurisdiction of
other states. 79 The court went on to note that the doctrine had since been
limited by an exception for commercial activity, 80 as reflected in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 81 The court also discussed
the objective "nature-of-the-act" test (as opposed to the purpose of the
act) used to determine if a specific act is commercial in nature, and,
therefore, not protected by the sovereign immunity doctrine found in 28
U.S.C. § 1603(d) of the FSIA.82
In what appeared a tacit agreement with the appellant's (union's)
argument (i.e. that the nature of OPEC's actions, as well as those of the
member states, is commercial in nature, therefore stripping them of
immunity), the court determined that, while the principles of the FSIA

briefs and presented oral argument, including, most notably, future Unites States
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. Id. at 575.
77. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d
1354, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
78. Id. at 1357-61.
79. Id. at 1357.
80. Id.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
82. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 77, at 1357. A lively ongoing debate exists
as to effect on the immunity afforded international organizations (lOs) by the FSIA,
which, in 1976, codified the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1605 et seq.; see also The Tate Letter, 26 Dep't State Bull. 984 (1952). The
restrictive theory, as represented by the FSIA, removes absolute immunity from
sovereign states for acts which are commercial in nature. The debate focuses on whether,
by enacting the FSIA, Congress intended to restrict the absolute immunity originally
conferred to 1Os in 1946 under the International Organizations Immunity Act (IOIA), 22
U.S.C. § 288 et seq. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335,
1341 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding it was not Congress' intent that the FSIA restrict the
immunity provided lOs by the 1OIA).
The so-called restrictive theory maintains that, because under the IOIA, lOs were to
enjoy the same immunity afforded sovereigns, and because the absolute immunity
enjoyed by sovereigns was restricted by the FSIA to acts jure imperii, the immunity
provided lOs should likewise be reduced. See, e.g., Broadbent v. Org. of American
States, 628 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (where plaintiff argued the same and court
avoided the question by finding the OAS was immune under either theory).
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were still relevant, the act of state doctrine was more apposite.8 3 The
court went on to discuss, in some detail, the history and purpose of the
act of state doctrine, much of which is beyond the scope of this
comment. 84
For the purpose of this comment, it should be sufficient to point out
the doctrine is a prudential one, rather than a jurisdictional one,
recognizing that it is not always advisable to have matters of foreign
relations decided by the courts.8 5 The doctrine states that the courts are
not to adjudicate politically sensitive issues, which would require them to
judge the legality of an act of a sovereign.86
The court noted that the act of state doctrine was not limited by the
commercial activity exception, as was the FSIA, and that commercial
actions can rise to the level of acts of state if they are done for the state's
betterment, thereby implicating the doctrine. 87 The court determined
that, because the price-fixing actions were taken for the benefit of the
public interests of the sovereigns, and because of the highly political
sensitivities involved, the act of state doctrine was applicable, and on that
ground, affirmed the lower court.88 The subsequent petition for writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied. 89 Twenty years would pass
before another putative plaintiff would emerge to attempt to apply
domestic antitrust law to OPEC.
2.

Prewitt v. OPEC

In a class action suit initiated by a gas station owner, and after a
systematic review of the public announcements and collective actions of
OPEC from March of 1998, until January of 2001, Judge Weiner of the
Northern District Court of Alabama, found it beyond dispute that "OPEC
was created and exists for the express purpose of coordinating, limiting,
stabilizing and otherwise controlling crude oil production and export in
order to increase its members' revenues." 90 The Prewitt court further
found-as a direct impact of the collusion of OPEC-the Unites States
economy was negatively impacted by approximately $80-$120 million
dollars per day, or $26.3-$39.4 billion dollars per year, in exaggerated oil

83. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 77, at 1358.
84. Id. at 1358-59.
85. Id. at 1358 (recognizing the need for the U.S. to speak with one voice and to
carry out a deliberate and united foreign policy).
86. Id. (citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
87. Id. at 1360.
88. Id. at 1361-62.
89. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 454 U.S.
1163 (1982).
90. Prewitt, supra note 7, at 2.
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costs. '

Having determined OPEC was in violation of the Sherman Act, and
because OPEC failed to appear and defend itself in the action, the court
entered a default judgment against OPEC.92 The court also provided
injunctive relief
for Prewitt and the class, barring OPEC from further
93
price-fixing.
Judge Weiner relied on three main points in distinguishing the Ninth
Circuit's decision in InternationalAss 'n of Machinists.94 The court first
determined OPEC's actions were clearly commercial in nature, and,
therefore, immunity under the FSIA was not available.9 5
The court also determined that, because the actions were
commercial in nature, the commercial activities exception to the acts of
state doctrine 96 applied, and, therefore, OPEC was denied its protection
as well.9 7 In support of the holding, the court also noted another
limitation to the acts of state doctrine. 98 Specifically, the court noted the
activities in dispute took place outside of the OPEC member nations'
territories (i.e. Vienna, Austria), and so the doctrine was inapplicable.9 9
The court further distinguished International Ass'n of Machinists by
noting that in that case, OPEC had been dismissed from the suit, leaving
only the individual
countries, whereas in Prewitt, OPEC alone was the
00
defendant.'
a.

Subsequent history of Prewitt v. OPEC

According to Spenser Weber Waller,' 0 Professor and Director of
the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at Loyola University
Chicago School of Law, the case was transferred to the Chief Justice of
the Northern District of Alabama, who vacated the default judgment and
injunctive relief, and set a briefing schedule for OPEC's motion to
91. Id. at 6.
92. Id. at 9-10.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 7-9.
95. Id. at 7 (citing 28 U.S.C § 1605(2)); see supra text accompanying note 82.
96. The court cited the plurality opinion in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 689-99 (1976) (holding that there is an exception to the
acts of state doctrine for commercial activities).
97. Prewitt, supra note 7, at 8. The court also noted that the acts of state doctrine
had been narrowed since Int'l Ass'n of Machinists by W.S. Kirkpatrick v. Environmental
Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
98. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,428 (1964).
99. Prewitt, supra note 7, at 8.
100. Id.
101. For an erudite examination of the FSIA, acts of state doctrine, comity, and their
application to OPEC, see Spenser Weber Waller, Suing OPEC, 64 U. Prrr. L. REv. 105
(Fall 2002) [hereinafter Suing OPEC].
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dismiss.
In its motion to dismiss, OPEC argued that the district court lacked
personal jurisdiction over the organization due to Prewitt's failure to
properly serve notice. 0 3 The argument was credited by the district court,
citing applicable Austrian law, which required OPEC's consent to be
served, and, therefore, dismissed the complaint. °4 Prewitt subsequently
made a motion to allow alternative service of process. 10 5 The district
court denied the motion, stating that in this case, OPEC could not be
subsequently appealed to the
effectively served with process. °6 10 Prewitt
7
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, applying a de novo
standard, 0 8 affirmed the district court's determination that proper service
was lacking, and moreover, under the particular circumstances of the
case, no proper service was possible. 10 9 In so holding, the court of
appeals noted that service of process on foreign entities by registered
mail (the means attempted by Prewitt) is only authorized where foreign
law does not prohibit it.1 10
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with the district
court's determination that the headquarters agreement between OPEC
and Austria, which had been enacted into law by the Austrian
Parliament, had the status of foreign law. 1 l The headquarters agreement
provided, in relevant part, "the service of legal process.., shall not take
place within the [OPEC] headquarters seat except with the express
consent of, and under conditions approved by, the Secretary General [of
' 12
OPEC]." "
Prewitt also appealed the districts court's denial of its motion for
alternative service of process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(f)(3), which was reviewed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
under an abuse of discretion standard." 3 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals determined it would be a clear affront to Austrian law (i.e.
headquarters agreement) to allow alternative service, in violation of
102. Id. at 113.
103. Prewitt, supra note 7,at 3.
104. Id. at 2.

105. Id.at7.
106. Id.at 7-8.
107. See generally Prewitt 2,supra note 7.
108. Id.at 920-21 (citing Vencor Hosp., Inc. v. Standard Life & Accident Ins., 279
F.3d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 2002)).
109. Id. at 919.
110. Id. at 923 (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(C)(ii)).
111. Id.at 924 n.13.
112. Id.at 923.
113. Id. at 921 (citing Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014
(9tb Cir. 2002)).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). As the court noted, the 1993
Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3)
provided, in pertinent part, that "an earnest effort should be made to
devise a method of communication that
is consistent with due process
'1 14
law."
foreign
to
offense
minimizes
and
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals went on to provide it found
no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Prewitt's motion
for alternative service, and went so far as to say it would have been an
abuse of discretion to allow alternative service under the
circumstances. 115 Following the issuance of the court's opinion, the
16
plaintiff made a motion for rehearing en banc, which was denied.
Thereafter, on May 25, 2004, Prewitt filed1 7 a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court, which is currently pending.'
The issues raised by the Prewitt case are significant and appear ripe
for resolution. Although unclear if certiorari will be granted, withouth
further amendment by the Court, the state of the law, at least in the ItI
Circuit, provides to OPEC complete immunity from suit--OPEC need
only withhold its consent to service in order to effectively preclude the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Even if, arguendo, a suit against OPEC were
to be ultimately successful, the enforceability of a money judgment, or
more problematic, the enforcement of injunctive relief, combined with
the cost of litigation, give potential litigants reason to pause before
initiating the next private action against OPEC.18
Having briefly discussed U.S. antitrust law, its two attempted
applications to OPEC, and the historical defenses to its application, we
now turn our attention to an examination of the OPEC member nations'
domestic approaches to antitrust. There exists a distinct lack of reliably
translated case law from the individual OPEC member nations, and,
therefore, the individual member nations' statutes and other9 codified law
are the sole source and focus of the survey which follows."

114. Id. at 927.
115. Id.at928n.21.
116. See Prewitt, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
117. Prewitt Enters., Inc. v. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 353 F.3d. 916
(1 1th Cir. 2003),petitionfor cert.filed, U.S.L.W. (U.S. May 25, 2004) (No. 03-1592).
118. Suing OPEC, supra note 101, at 154-55 (noting the futility of the exercise).
119. Those of my colleagues who have attempted to do similar social and legal
research involving nations with unique languages, legal systems and divergent attitudes
towards the dissemination of information in general, can empathize with the arduous
nature of the task at hand.
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11 Member Nations' Antitrust Law
Algeria

Algeria's commercial code 120 and civil code 12 1 do not address
antitrust issues in the same manner as the United States. 122 Although
officially a republic, 123 Algeria operates as a socialist state, 124 and,
therefore, the state exercises a complete monopoly on foreign trade. 25
Additionally,
the state controls the price of goods that travel in foreign
126
commerce.
Algeria's economy is not based on the precept of fair competition,
and accordingly, with respect to its actions with OPEC, Algeria cannot
be said to act inconsistently with its domestic approach to antitrust. Its
lack of privatized industry negates the need for controls on
anticompetitive actions by market participants. The government itself is
a de facto monopoly, and as such, does not engage in contradictory
action through its membership in the world's largest international oil
cartel.
B. Indonesia
Indonesia's economy is currently in a transitional phase, where, in
addition to trying to stabilize after its recent economic crisis, the
government is relaxing its regulation of the economy in favor of greater
private autonomy, while at the same time, trying to prevent the formation
28
of monopolies. 127 Before passing its comprehensive competition law,'
120. COMMERCIAL CODE (Algeria), translatedin COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE
EAST (Allen P.K. Keesee ed., 1981) [hereinafter ALGERIA COMM. CODE].
121. CIVIL CODE (Algeria), translated in COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
(Allen P.K. Keesee ed., 1988) [hereinafter ALGERIA CIV. CODE].
122. See ALGERIA COMM. CODE, supra note 120; see also ALGERIA Civ. CODE, supra
note 121.
123. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book- Algeria, available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sy.html#Govt (last visited Sept. 6,
2004) [hereinafter CIA].
124. ALG. CONST. art. 195 (stating the "socialist choice" cannot be changed by
amendment).
125. LAW No. 78-02, LAW PROVIDING FOR STATE MONOPOLY OF ExTERNAL TRADE
(Algeria), translatedin COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST (Allen P.K. Keesee ed.,
1988) [hereinafter ALG. MONOPOLY LAW].
126. Id. at art. 6(4).
127. Norman S. Pakpahan, Competition Law and Policy In Indonesia:An Agenda for
Economic Law Reform, in COMPETITION REGULATION IN THE PACIFIC RIM 151, 154 (Carl
J. Green, Douglas E. Rosenthal eds., 1996) [hereinafter Indonesia Economic Law
Reform].
During his 32-year tenure, Suharto and his family are credited with amassing a $25
billion dollar empire, largely from kickbacks and pilfering. Jared Levinson, "Living
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Indonesia did not have substantially similar laws as part of its statutory
compilations. It did, however, have several references to competition
scattered throughout various enactments,
as well as a proposed draft of a
1 29
comprehensive competition bill.
One such reference, proscribing monopolistic practices, was
included in the State Policy Guidelines, which detailed several conditions
Indonesia wished to avoid while emerging into a more privatized
economy.1 30 Additionally, Article 382 of Indonesia's Criminal Code
specifically proscribes unfair competition through misleading the public
131
in order to make gain or expanding the results of trade.
Another example of Indonesia's increased concern for, and attention
to, antitrust issues in the early 1990's, is reflected in their company
law. 132 Law Number 1 of 1995 requires all formations and mergers of
companies to "observe the interests of the public and fair competition in
business.' 33 This provision was further expounded upon by the
elucidation to the law, 134 which provides that business combinations135that
form a monopoly are illegal if they would entail a loss to the public.
While the various aforementioned enactments represented a
piecemeal patchwork of antitrust provisions, generally seeking to prevent
monopolies and other anticompetitive actions, a comprehensive
competition law was eventually enacted in 1999.136 The Indonesian
Monopoly Law 137 has been criticized as being prematurely forced onto a
country that did not have the ideological underpinnings in place essential
for such a law to be meaningful and effective. 13 8 Additional criticism of
Dangerously": Indonesia and the Reality of the Global Economic System, 7 D.C.L.J.
INT'L L. & PRAc. 425, 431 (1998). For a detailed discussion of the crisis and its causes
(including Suharto's "crony capitalism"), see id.
128. Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 1999, Tentang Larangan
Praktek Monopoli Dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat (translated as Republic of
Indonesia Law No. 5 of 1999, Concerning the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and
Unhealthy Business Competition) [hereinafter INDONESIA MONOPOLY LAW].
129. Indonesia Economic Law Reform, supra note 127, at 154.
130. Id. at 155-56 (quoting The Republic of Indonesia State Guidelines, 1993. BP-7
Pusat 1994 (p.55) "Unfair and unhealthy competition through monopolization of
economic activities at the expense of the people. Monopoly, oligopoly and monopsony
are inimicable to social justice.").
131. Indonesia Economic Law Reform, supra note 127, at 159; see also id. at 159
n.14.
132. See id. at 162.
133. Id. at 162 (quoting Law 1/1995, art. 104(l)(b) (Indonesia)); see id. at 162 n.20.
134. Id. at 163 (stating that the elucidations to the law have the same binding legal
force as the law itself).
135. Id. at 163; see also id. at 163 n.21 (citing Elucidation, Law 1.1995 art. 104,
Paragraph (1)).
136. INDONESIA MONOPOLY LAW, supra note 128.
137. Id.
138. James Soemijantoro Wilson, Note, Why Foreign Aid Fails: Lessons from
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the law has included the fact that the body charged with enforcement of
the law has no independence from the executive, who has the power to
and to exempt public and private entities from the
direct its enforcements
39
law entirely. 1
While these criticisms of the law are well founded, they are
somewhat shortsighted. The Indonesian Monopoly Law represents only
the first comprehensive attempt at competition regulation within
Indonesia.140 The law can be amended, rewritten or supplemented, as
needed, in order to effectuate its aims. Additionally, the law will help
bring national focus to the underlying values it presupposes,
41 and,
thereby, accelerate the further development of those very values. 1
In light of Indonesia's antitrust laws, when Indonesia acts as part of
the OPEC oil cartel, it is acting in an ideologically inconsistent manner
with the economic policies it is attempting to embrace. While its
existing laws do not expressly prohibit its participation in the collusive
actions of OPEC, there can be no doubt its actions, through OPEC, are in
diametric opposition to the precepts of fair trade and competition--the
very policies it is attempting to instill in its own economy. As Indonesia
continues to move towards an economic model that is more deeply
rooted in fair competition, its inconsistent actions with OPEC will
become more and more transparent and pronounced.
C. Iran
Iran's commercial law 142 and civil code 143 do not discuss antitrust
issues. 44 Iran has nationalized most of its industry, including oil, gas,
railroads, electricity, fisheries, metallurgy, ship and airplane building,
and mining. 145 While private ownership of non-controlled businesses is
Indonesia's Economic Collapse, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 145, 166-67 (2001).
139. Id. at 167 n.101.
140. See INDONESIA MONOPOLY LAW, supra note 128.
141. Despite a conscientious attempt, which included several visits to, and searches
of, the unparalleled resources of the United States Library of Congress, at the time of this
writing, the author was unable to procure a translated copy of Undang-Undang Republik
Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 1999, Tentang Larangan Praktek Monopoli Dan Persaingan
Usaha Tidak Sehat (translatedas Republic of Indonesia Law No. 5 of 1999, Concerning
the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unhealthy Business Competition), supra
note 128. Accordingly, a more detailed examination of its provisions was, unfortunately,
not possible.
142.

COMMERCIAL LAW (Iran), translatedin COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

(Allen P.K. Keesee ed., 1982) [hereinafter IRAN COMM. LAW].
143. CIVIL CODE (Iran), translatedin COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST (Allen
P.K. Keesee ed., 1982) [hereinafter IRAN CIVIL CODE].
144. See IRAN COMM. LAW, supra note 142; see also IRAN CIVIL CODE, supra
note 143.
145.

LAW No. 7/226, LAW ON PROTECTION

AND DEVELOPMENT OF IRANIAN
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recognized, 146 based upon the lack of treatment in Iran's codifications, it
appears collusive actions are not practiced in Iran. Accordingly, Iran's
actions through OPEC are not inconsistent with its domestic approach, or
lack thereof, to antitrust.
D. Iraq
With the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in the winter of 2003, the
development of the Governing Council, and the early transfer of power
on June 28, 2004,147 to the provisional Iraqi government, 148 Iraq's-laws

are in a state of flux. The form they will eventually take may or may not
reflect the democratic influences of the U.S. and the other coalifion
members. However, the manner in which they are decided upon,
instituted, and enforced, will undoubtedly be a dramatic departure from
the dictatorial nature seen under the former regime.
Although the future of Iraq's economic enactments is quite unclear,
the laws under Saddam created a scheme of government mandated price
control. 149 Merchants were forbidden from selling commodities at prices
above or below a set price decided upon by the government.1 50
This type of economic control by the government, similar to that
used by Nigeria, discussed infra, effectively eliminates price-fixing by
market participants., Additionally, it is unlikely companies would be
allowed to create monopolies without state sanction in such a sociopolitical environment, although the issue was not addressed directly in
Iraq's codifications. 151

Iraqi law addresses something referred to as "unfair competition;"
however, Iraq's law does not use the term in the same sense it is used in
the United States. For instance, under Iraq's commercial laws, Iraqi
merchants are forbidden from using another's trade name(s), violating
patents, and "stealing" another's employees or trade secrets. 152 Owing to
the fact Iraq's laws do not presently address antitrust issues in the same
manner as those of the U.S., Iraq cannot be said to act in an inconsistent

1(a-b) (Iran), translated in COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
(Allen P.K. Keesee ed., 1982).
146. Id. at art. 1(d).
147. See George Melloan, Allawi's Accession Changes the Game in Iraq, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, June 29, 2004, at A15.
148. See Robin Wright and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S. Seeks Compromise Planfor
Iraqi PoliticalTransition,WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 16, 2003, at A30.
149. COMMERCIAL LAW art. 8 (Iraq), translatedin BUSINESS LAWS OF IRAQ-VOLUME
II (Nicola H. Karam ed., 1990).
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Id. at art. 98(1-2).
INDUSTRIES art.
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manner with its domestic approach when acting through OPEC.153 If
Iraq eventually embraces an open political system, replete with an open
market economy, market conditions may subsequently require Iraq to
address antitrust issues directly. Until then, its further participation in
OPEC will not directly contradict its domestic policy towards antitrust.
As has been seen in the unrest following the largely uneventful
overthrow of Saddam, Iraq can be an enigma. Another uncertainty is the
future affect the U.S.'s influence will have with regard to Iraq's oil
production, and how it may, or may not, impact Iraq's continued
membership in OPEC.
E.

Kuwait

Like Iran and Iraq, Kuwait's Commercial Code' 54 does not address
antitrust law in the same sense as the United States. Kuwaiti law
proscribes fraud and cheating in the sale of goods, 55 the giving of false
information about the origin and quality of goods, 156 as well as "stealing"
57
employees away from a competitor.
An argument could be made that collusion is a form of fraud or
cheating, and, therefore, represents an inconsistency between Kuwait's
domestic policies and its actions through OPEC.
However, that
argument is tenuous at best and was not contemplated by Kuwait's
various enactments. Therefore, because Kuwaiti law does not embrace
antitrust, they too cannot be said to act contrary to their domestic laws
when acting through OPEC.
F.

Libya

Libya's official gazette is published solely in Arabic. 158 A search of
the records of the Library of Congress, as well as consultations with its

153. It will be interesting to watch Iraq as it emerges from the Saddam years, with so
much of its future unclear, including its continued participation in OPEC. It would not be
beyond the realm of possibility for the U.S. to utilize its present position of influence in
Iraqi affairs, albeit a temporal one, to suggest that Iraq withdraw from OPEC.
Such a departure would significantly reduce OPEC's collective power and would
strike what would most likely be a demoralizing blow to the organization, as Iraq was
host of the conference that spawned OPEC. See supra note 14. Additionally, the flow of
Iraqi oil into the world market-unimpeded by OPEC's production limitations-would

generate badly needed capital for Iraq, while at the same time, reduce global oil prices.
154. COMMERCIAL CODE (Kuwait), translated in COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE
EAST (Allen P.K. Keesee ed., 1989).
155. Id. at art. 56.
156. Id. at art. 57.
157. Id.
158. See al-Jarida al-rasmiyah (Libyan gazette, published sporadically in Arabic from
Sept. 24, 1969, to-date).
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Middle East and North African Legal Specialist, revealed no translations
into English. Accordingly, it was not possible to include the domestic
laws of Libya in this survey. However, given its tumultuous history and
underdeveloped economy,' 59 it is unlikely to have considered antitrust
issues with any specificity.
G. Nigeria
Nigeria's approach to price control is the opposite of what would be
imagined in the United States. As previously noted, the economic
policies of the U.S. promote competition among individual merchants
and corporations alike, each striving to develop a less costly product so
as to undersell the competition. Nigeria's economic policy is one of
price limitation, not unlike Iraq's under Saddam, discussed supra, where
and not through the
prices are controlled through governmental mandates160
rigors of fair competition among market participants.
162
In its Price Control Act,16' Nigeria has identified certain goods many of which represent common staples of life-which cannot be sold
for more than their government-assigned sale price. 163 Additionally, the
act forbids the hoarding of the enumerated controlled goods. 164 The act
appears to be directed primarily at individual merchants, 65 although a
166
provision is included in the enactment that encompasses corporations..
Nigeria, therefore, cannot be said to act in an inconsistent manner when
it acts through OPEC.
H. Qatar
The civil 1 67 and commercial 168 codes of Qatar are devoid of

159. See CIA-Libya, supra note 123, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/ly.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
160. PRICE CONTROL ACT, Chapter 365, sect. 6 (Nig.) [hereinafter PRICE CONTROL
ACT].

161. Id. at Chapter 365.
162. Nigeria's price controlled commodities include: bicycles and parts;
flour; matches; milk; motorcycles and parts; motor vehicles and parts; petroleum
products; salt; and sugar. Id. at Chapter 365, First Schedule.
163. Id. at Chapter 365, sects. 4-6.
164. Id. at Chapter 365, sect. 7.
165. Id. at Chapter 365, sect. 6(l) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to sell... any
controlled commodity at a price which exceeds the controlled price.") (emphasis
provided).
166. Id. at Chapter 365, sect. 14.
167. CIVIL CODE (Qatar), translated in COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
(Allen P.K. Keesee ed., 1989) [hereinafter QATAR CIV. CODE].

168. COMMERCIAL CODE (Qatar), translated in COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE
EAST (Allen P.K. Keesee ed., 1989) [hereinafter QATAR COMM. CODE].
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provisions similar to U.S. antitrust laws. 69 When examining the
enactments, it becomes clear the focus is not the proscription of collusive
action, but rather, regulating the independent actions of individual
merchants. 70 Qatar's unfair competition article reads, in relevant part:
"A merchant shall not resort to deceit or fraud in marketing his goods
and he shall not disseminate false statements which may prejudice the
interests of1 a competitor merchant; in default he shall be liable for
17
damages."
As mentioned previously, an argument could be posited whereby
the aforementioned enactment could be applied to a situation where a
merchant acts in collusion with others to artificially inflate the price of a
good. However, the law is concerned with merchants who make false
claims about the quality of their goods or the goods of other merchants.
It would be an extremely awkward interpretation of Qatar's unfair
competition law to argue it applies to collusion or other anticompetitive
acts. In addition to the aforementioned provision, Qatar's Commercial
Code also contains articles prohibiting the use of other merchants' trade
names,1 72 making false statements about the origin of goods, or other
misleading practices, "theft" of other merchants' clients,173 or "theft" of a
employees in order to obtain his clients and/or trade
competitor's
74
secrets.
From Qatar's lack of statutory treatment of antitrust, it appears
collusion, monopolies and other anticompetitive actions, do not occur or
are not seen as negative practices. Regardless, Qatar does not act
inconsistently with its domestic economic laws and policies when it acts
through OPEC.
I.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi
together as
reduce the
the quality
code does
169.
170.
168.

Arabia's Commercial Code 175 permits companies to work
co-operative corporations; 176 however, only if their aim is to
cost, purchase price, or sale price of an item, or to improve
of a product or the quality of a service. 177 The commercial
not detail the types of practices that are permissible, but,

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
See QATAR CIV. CODE, supra note 167; see also QATAR COMM. CODE, supra note

171.

QATAR COMM. CODE, supra note 168, at art. 243.

172.
173.
174.

Id. at art. 242.
Id. at art. 244.
Id. at art. 245.

175.

COMMERCIAL CODE (Saudi Arabia), translated in BUSINESS LAWS OF SAUDI

ARABIA (Nicola H. Karam ed., 1977) [hereinafter SAUDI COMM. CODE].
176.
177.

Id. at CoMPANiEs LAW, art. 189.
Id. at COMPANIES LAW, art. 189 (1-2) (emphasis provided).
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rather, refers only to "co-operative principles."' 78 It is clear under the
law, however, that the co-operative groups would not be permitted to
artificially increase the price of the good or service through "cooperative
principles.' 7 9
The commercial code explicitly proscribes conduct inconsistents
80
with the precepts of Islam,' as well as acts of cheating, falsification,'8
fraud, parsimony, duplicity, or the super-generic proscription of "any
wrongful act."' 82 Again, the collusion of the OPEC member nations to
tailor oil production so as to inflate its price, could be considered a form
of "cheating;" thereby, allowing the member nations to effectively
strong-arm their reluctant customers into paying inflated prices. The key
role played by oil-and its many byproducts--in today's economy
member nation
cannot be overstated, and is underscored by OPEC
83
price.
domestic
maximum
its
of
controlling
Nigeria's
If OPEC's actions do qualify as "cheating," clearly a highly
subjective notion, it could be argued Saudi Arabia engages in
inconsistent conduct by proscribing behavior it engages in through its
participation in OPEC. In the absence of specific antitrust laws, the
aforementioned interpretation of "cheating" is far too attenuated.
Accordingly, it cannot be said Saudi Arabia acts in an inconsistent
manner with its domestic provisions when it participates with OPEC.
J. UnitedArab Emirates
The domestic laws of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), like
Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, discussed
supra, do not address antitrust directly in their commercial code. 8 4 Like
Qatar, the U.A.E. addresses "unfair competition," and, like Qatar, the
178. Id. at COMPANIES LAW, art. 189 ("Joint stock companies or limited liability
companies may be incorporated according to co-operativeprinciples, if, by the common
endeavors of all the partners and in their interests ....) (emphasis provided).
179. Id. at COMPANIES LAW, art, 189 (1).
180. A discussion of the precepts of Islam is beyond the scope of this comment.
181. See generally LAW To COMBAT COMMERCIAL FRAUD arts. 1-2 (Saudi Arabia),
translated in BUSINESS LAWS OF SAUDI ARABIA-VOLUME II (Nicola H. Karam ed.,
2000) (prohibiting the falsification of the identity, nature, kind, origin, weight, quality of
goods, as well as deceptive advertising of goods).
182. SAUDI COMM. CODE, supra note 175, at COMMERCIAL LAW, art. 5.
183. PRICE CONTROL ACT, supra note 160, at Chapter 365, First Schedule; see supra
note 162 (detailing the specifically controlled commodities).
184. See COMMERCIAL CODE (United Arab Emirates), translated in THE LAW OF
COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (Dawoud Sudqi El Alami,

1994) [hereinafter U.A.E. COMM. CODE].
Antitrust is also not discussed in the U.A.E.'s COMPANIES LAW. See FEDERAL LAW
No. 8 OF 1984 REGARDING COMMERCIAL COMPANIES (United Arab Emirates), translated
in COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST (Allen P.K. Keesee ed., 1987).
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proscribed
conduct includes "theft" of employees, customers, or trade
85
secrets. 1
The code also proscribes dissemination of false information relating
186
to the origin or quality of goods, as well as the trader's qualifications.
Additionally, a trader is not to use methods of fraud or deceit to sell
goods, or to spread falsehoods about a competitor to the competitor's
detriment. 187
These provisions do not encompass collusion among market
participants, except by the most strained reading of "fraud." It would
seem the U.A.E. does not suffer from the ills of collusion, or does not see
collusion as a negative element of its economy. Regardless, through its
participation in OPEC, the U.A.E. does not engage in a course of conduct
it proscribes for its citizenry.
K. Venezuela
Venezuela is the second of the surveyed OPEC member nations to
enact specific antitrust legislation.' 88 Venezuela's antitrust law 189 states
as its objective: "the promotion and protection of the exercise of free
competition, and the prohibition of monopolies and other practices that
restrict, impede, or limit economic freedom."' 90 The law is applicable to
persons and companies, both public and private, who are engaged in
economic activity within the country. 191 The law generally prohibits any
conduct, practice, agreement, convention, contract or decision that
impedes, restricts, falsifies, or otherwise limits free competition.' 92
More specifically, the law prohibits "all actions designed to restrict
free competition,"'' 93 as well as "all conduct intended to manipulate

185.
186.

U.A.E. COMM. CODE, supra note 184, at art. 64.
Id. at art. 65.
Id. at art. 66; see generally SUPPRESSION OF FRAUD AND DECEIT IN COMMERCIAL

187.
TRANSACTIONS art. 1 (United Arab Emirates), translated in COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE

MIDDLE EAST (Allen P.K. Keesee ed., 1982) (outlawing "cheating" by falsifying the
number, quality, etc., of goods sold).
188. The other OPEC member nation to directly address antitrust was Indonesia,
discussed supra.

189. Ley Para Promover y Protegar el Ejercicio de la Libre Competercia de 13 Dec.
1991 (translated as "Law to Promote and Protect the Exercise of Free Competition")
Gaceta
Official
26
Feb.
1992
(translation
available
at
http://www.procompetencia.gov.ve/lppelc-eng.html)
(last visited Sept. 6, 2004)
[hereinafter VEN. ANTITRUST LAW].

190. Id. at art. 1.
191. Id. at art. 4. An exception is made for anticompetitive practices which have been
approved by the government, provided the activity is, inter alia, for the benefit of
consumers and users. Id. at art. 18.
192. Id. at art. 5.
193. Id. at art. 7.
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factors of production, distribution, technological innovation, 1' or
94
investments, in such a way as to be detrimental to free competition."
The law also specifically forbids "agreements or conventions entered
into directly or indirectly ...which restrict or impede competition
between their members."'1 95 Not surprisingly, agreements to fix prices, as
well as agreements to limit196production to affect a product's price, are
also specifically proscribed.
Through its membership in OPEC (an organization which openly
and unabashedly rejects free competition in the global oil market and
tailors production in order to fix prices at artificially high levels),
Venezuela seems to reject its declared ideals of free competition and
economic freedom in favor of collusion and patently anticompetitive
actions. Indeed, one can scarcely envision two more diametrically
opposed economic policies.
The Venezuelan Antitrust Law' 97 is admittedly inapplicable to the
government of Venezuela for at least three reasons. First, under
Venezuela's Antitrust Law, the economic activity at issue must be done
within Venezuela,' 98 which is not the case when Venezuela acts through
OPEC, headquartered in Vienna, Austria. Second is an exception to the
law which allows the government to approve anticompetitive actions
Lastly, Venezuela has
which satisfy several requirements.199
200
nationalized its oil industry and so has a de facto monopoly over it.
Nonetheless, Venezuela's marked departure from its declared ideal
economic landscape, replete with vigorous competition among its market
participants, does seem to evidence a certain degree of hypocrisy.2 °1
Perhaps Venezuela's leaders have determined the economic benefits
of increased oil revenue, through its collusion with OPEC, outweigh any
uneasiness generated from such transparent inconsistency with its
domestic approach to antitrust. Similarly, Venezuela's policy creators
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at art. 8.
Id. at art. 9.
Id. at art. 10.
See supra note 189.
Id. at art. 4.
Id. at art. 18.

200.

JULIAN 0. VON KALINowsKI, WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION, sec.

1.01 (1986).

For a detailed discussion of the history of Venezuelan antitrust law, see GUSTAVO
BRILLEMBOURG,

VENEZUELAN

LAW

GOVERNING

REsTRICTIvE

BUSINESS PRINCIPLES

(1985).
201. Of course, every nation has an inherent and assumed right to act in its own
perceived best interests, including the determination of which industries should be owned
and/or otherwise controlled by the government. See, e.g., Paul Steven Dempsey,
Competition in the Air: European Union Regulation of Commercial Aviation, 66 J. AIR L.
& COM. 979, 983-84 (Summer 2001) (noting the relaxation of the European Union
member nations' governmental control of the airline industry).
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may have determined the economic benefits from increased oil revenues
outweigh the benefits of political goodwill which would undoubtedly
flow to Venezuela by its withdrawal from OPEC and its pursuit of a
more consistent approach to free competition in the global oil market.
V.

Conclusion

The collusive actions of OPEC, notwithstanding its apparent
immunity from personal jurisdiction, are a clear violation of U.S.
antitrust law. Although two cases have been initiated in U.S. courts
against OPEC, each has been decided in OPEC's favor, both at trial and
on appeal. The issues presented in the Prewitt case are of national
significance and the various U.S. courts are in need of definitive
guidance from the Supreme Court. If the Court denies certiorari, the
practical effect will be that OPEC will enjoy complete immunity from
suit in U.S. courts, simply through withholding its consent to service.
Due to the U.S.'s oil production/consumption deficit, the U.S. must
import oil to satisfy its demand, approximately half of which is imported
from member nations of OPEC. 20 2 The oil imported into the U.S. reflects
a price that has been artificially increased through OPEC's collective oil
production limitations.
After providing an overview of the U.S.'s antitrust laws, this
comment sought to survey the eleven OPEC member nations' domestic
approaches to antitrust in order to determine if they act consistently with
their domestic approaches to antitrust. Of the ten OPEC member nations
whose laws were available to be examined,20 3 only Indonesia and
Venezuela have promulgated laws that specifically address antitrust
issues. 2°
The remaining eight countries 20 5 have nationalized economies, or
parts thereof,20 6 state-controlled prices, 20 7 or have no applicable
provisions.20 8 These eight countries cannot be said to act inconsistently
202. See supra notes 3-5.
203. Libya was not a part of the survey due to the unavailability of English
translations of Libyan laws, despite a search of the United States Library of Congress'
collection, as well as discussions with the Library's Middle East and North African Legal
Specialist.
204. See supra discussion section IV(A-K).
205. These include: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates.
206. These include: Algeria (state monopoly of foreign trade, state controlled prices),
Iran (nationalized many industries), and Venezuela (although has antitrust legislation, has
nationalized oil industry).
207. These include: Algeria (state price control), Iraq (future unclear, state price
control under Saddam), and Nigeria (state price control).
208. These include: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates.
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with their domestic approaches to antitrust when they act as part of the
OPEC oil cartel.
The same cannot be said, however, for Indonesia, and especially
Venezuela, which has the more developed antitrust position of the two.
Both Indonesia 209 and Venezuela 2 1° directly prohibit monopolies and
other anticompetitive practices, yet each participates in the world's
largest oil cartel. While neither country violates their respective
domestic laws through their participation in OPEC, each acts with a
certain degree of inconsistency with the economic mores each country
purports to embrace.
While OPEC's collusion has negatively impacted global petroleum
prices for forty-four years, in the long-term, the eventual dissolution of
OPEC is unavoidable. If by no other means, OPEC will eventually
disband when the oil pumps fail, for oil is a finite and non-renewable
resource. 2 11 In the short-term, the U.S., and all other oil importing
nations, should deliberately concentrate on developing economically
viable renewable alternatives to petroleum. By eliminating the U.S.'s
dependence on oil, the nation would be strategically safer,
environmentally 21sounder,
and its economy would be free of OPEC's
2
parasitic effects.

209. See supra note 128.
210. See supra note 189.
211. Gary D. Meyers & Simone C. Muller, The Ethical Implications, Political
Ramifications and Practical Limitations of Adopting Sustainable Development as
National and International Policy, 4 BUF. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 41-42 (1996) (advocating a
transition of dependence from non-renewable fossil fuels to renewable sources for energy
production).
212. The deleterious effects of the U.S.'s petroleum dependency will only be
exasperated in the future by the emerging economies of nations such as China, whose
already robust demand for petroleum will increase dramatically as its economy develops
into its full potential. See Timothy L. Fort, Cindy A. Schipani, Ecology and Violence:
The Environmental Dimensions of War, 29 COLUM. J. ENwVT. L. 243, 248-49 (2004)
(noting China's economic growth of 93% between 1990 and 1996, as well as the roughly
3.5% annual increase in petroleum demand, especially from China and Latin America, as
those economies develop and industrialize).

